(A commentary follows on page 25) The purpose of the National Health Service Act of I 946 was to ensure the provision of health services to everyone in the population regardless of financial means, age, sex, employment or area. An implicit assumption was that the provision of such a service would improve health through treatment and prevention, and ultimately diminish the demands on it.
Many of the original aims of the service appear to have been achieved. Higher expectations of health on the part of the population and expanding possibilities for intervention on the part of the professions, however, have led to continually increasing expenditure, and not to the economy expected.
It is often stated that the problems of the National Health Service could be resolved by the allocation of additional monies. Indeed, in the past, this has frequently been the case, at least superficially. The reality now is that the rising costs of health care are ofconcern to governments throughout the Western world, and produce similar problems no matter how the system is Key words Ethics of resource allocations; medical ethics; hospital manning; acute and chronic medicine; geriatrics.
funded or how much is already spent. In a declining economy the problems are especially acute, and are compounded by the rigidity often imposed on systems when they are under financial constraint.
There is no simple way of deciding, when the demand exceeds the supply, how available resources ought to be allocated. In the past allocations appear to have been made on the basis of tradition, evolution, emotion and optimism.
The traditional basis of medicine is that of saving life. The so-called 'acute' specialties have therefore been awarded priority. Many of the problems with which they currently cope, however, are less than acute and many lives incapable of being saved.
Services have evolved largely as a result of technical developments in investigation and treatment. These have concentrated care in hospitals and have led to an expansion in the concept of routine investigation. While much of this expansion has been of considerable value, some confers doubtful benefit and even possible harm. New techniques have created a demand for universal adoption often with major resource implications.
Emotion affects the decision-making process. Each doctor does the best he or she can for his or her individual patients, but some specialists are in practice able to do more than others. This difference is reflected in the hierarchy of prestige in the medical profession, as well as in the distribution of resources. Physical and mental handicap, mental illness and old age, though regarded with sympathy, have generally not had the same emotional appeal nor invited the same commitment of resources as conditions more amenable to active intervention, for example by cardiac surgery.
Optimism influences decision-making by suggesting that technical advance will achieve therapeutic success. Sometimes this happens. But at other times technical advance in one field, whether or not it is valuable in itself, is achieved at the expense of patients suffering from other conditions, who might have been helped by simpler, less expensive, treatments.
A valuable study, The Ethics ofResource Allocation in Health Care, edited by K M Boyd, reveals the complex inter-relationship between these and other factors and the many levels of decision-making involved in the determination of priorities. While stressing that there can be no general solution to the problems of resource allocation, it encourages the investigation of particular decisions as one way ofexposing the actual values being expressed within them. This way ofconsidering ethical issues, by exposing values rather than by arguing from principles, is still relatively unfamiliar. What follows is an attempt to apply the method to a decision made by the Newcastle Area Health Authority concerning the proposed temporary closure of Walkergate Hospital. The example has been chosen not in any critical spirit, but simply because it illustrates some ofthe complexity of the interactions in a matter which aroused considerable public interest.
The fact that the problem was eventually rendered much less acute by an unexpected injection of new finance does not diminish its significance as a case study. Value-decisions may be highlighted by financial stringency, but this does not mean that they are not implicit when money is more plentiful. Most of those working in the specialties due to be transferred elsewhere accepted the plan after some initial opposition. However, since at different stages in the discussion different specialties stood to lose most beds, the focus of opposition tended to shift. The division of medicine, which originally supported the plan on the grounds that it would eventually increase the number of geriatric beds, later withdrew its support through lack ofconfidence that Walkergate would be rebuilt in the five years proposed. The plan was to transfer 6o geriatric beds permanently to a smaller local hospital, which had previously been closed. When Walkergate was rebuilt, its beds would eventually produce a considerable net gain, as well as allowing greater flexibility in the kind of provision for old people. But doubts were expressed about whether in a period of increasing financial stringency this would ever happen. Despite the assurance given in a subsequent planning document that 'the Authority was resolved that [the plan] should not proceed unless, at the time of the closure, there was clear evidence that the hospital could be brought back into use within 5 years', it is in the nature of such cases that guarantees are not possible.
Meanwhile The Community Health Council, though its positive proposals correctly anticipated the eventual outcome, was conscious of many pitfalls in its attempts to represent the public interest. Local opinion almost always resists closures, but is usually unaware of the wider ramifications of particular decisions.
The role played by the media in the whole affair is uncertain. Most people claimed to be uninfluenced by scare stories in the press. Such stories can nevertheless have an indirect effect by setting the terms in which issues are discussed. One geriatrician was of the opinion that the press had damaged the cause of the elderly by focusing attention on 'long stay homes for the old folks' rather than on the possibilities of active care.
Underlying issues
The planners' dream of being able to employ an objective cost-benefit analysis to determine priorities bears little relationship to actual decision-making. Decisions emerge out of complicated interactions, and it is difficult to see how they could do otherwise in a democratic society. Behind these interactions, however, lie assumptions, often unexamined, which need to be brought out into the open, even if this does not make the decisions any easier. There are, for example, inherent conflicts of interest between acute and chronic medicine. The role of the Freeman Hospital and its effects on the resources ofthe Newcastle area illustrate the conflict, but it is not a simple case of money for cardiac units versus money for geriatric wards. Developments in acute medicine, and the provision of more acute beds, may relieve pressure on geriatric facilities by allowing more elderly people to return to the community. On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of 'blocked beds' in acute wards, which reduces the overall flow of patients, and can cause frustration and discontent among the staff.
Behind such practical issues lurk major problems of definition, which limit all attempts to compartmentalise. Even the age criteria for 'geriatric' differ between two areas as close as Newcastle and Sunderland. Nor can provision for the elderly be confmed to the National Health Service alone. Local Authority Social Services Departments and Housing Departments both have a part to play, not to mention the role of families and friends. The Walkergate Village project was conceived as an attempt to break down some of these compartments, but was criticised as creating a separate compartment for the elderly, and, as has been said, labelled a 'ghetto'. It would seem from an ethical point of view that the requirement to treat patients as people, and to take account of their total circumstances, weighs against the demands of administrative tidiness. If the system is to be tolerable, though, for those who operate it, some degree of compartmenting is inevitable. Much then depends upon the relationship between the compartments. In a world of competing specialisms there is an incentive to maintain high standards and chalk up 'successes'. But unless competition is balanced by trust it can lead to a kind of defensiveness which in the end works against everybody's interest. Particularly in a time of financial stringency, when everyone wishes to defend his own, it becomes extremely difficult to make bold decisions. In a static system this would be bad enough. Medicine, however, suffers from 'creeping growth' -the gradual and largely uncontrollable accumulation of new ideas, techniques and possibilities of treatment, coupled with continually rising expectations among patients. Pruning what is already there is not easy. The result is that more and more layers are added to an already overloaded structure, while attempts to rationalise or rethink are resisted.
Mistrust between the medical profession, the administration and the public, and between the Government, Health Regions and Health Areas, is exacerbated by the inordinately long timescale in the National Health Service planning process. In the present case a key factor was the original decision to build the Freeman Hospital in the early I960's. Changes of policy within such a timescale become inevitable, but they give rise to doubts about the ability of the authorities to fulfil their long-term intentions. Such doubts, set within a more general context of competitive defensiveness, and allied with unexamined popular assumptions about the appropriate kind of provision for the 'old folks', appear to have been decisive features in the Walkergate story. A more explicit agreement on general principles might help to strengthen understanding between different sections of the Health Service as a sie qua non ofsuccessful planning.
Conclusion
The moral of the story is a confused one. An individual doctor asked to decide between using limited resources for heart surgery or providing facilities for old people might find such a choice intolerable. Committees find it equally hard to make clear choices about priorities, and to stick to them, though they have the advantage of being further from the distressing personal and individual factors which weigh more heavily on those facing actual choices about particular patients. Concentration on more immediate but less personal matters, such as adjustments, costs and bargaining powers, enables decisions to be made, though in retrospect the process often looks messy and the eventual decisions less than ideal.
When the inherent difficulty of the process is compounded by lack of trust, in-fighting and the uncertainties of popular feeling, it is not surprising that a practical solution which avoids the main underlying issues, is grasped with relief.
Subsequent analysis, as in this paper, in allowing some of the underlying issues to come to the surface outside the immediate context of decision-making, might help to improve the quality of future decisions. A more general and widespread examination of basic principles might also help to create a climate of opinion in which changes could be more readily accepted as part of a comprehensive vision.
A useful start might be made, for instance, by examining the way in which life-saving measures are held in balance with other less urgent goals, such as comfort and convenience, outside medicine. Decisions have to be made on a wide range of subjects from the design of cars to the price of cigarettes. Considerations of safety often have a surprisingly low priority.
There are occasions, though, when in the public mind the saving of a particular life becomes a matter of paramount interest and importance. Huge resources may be used in a single rescue operation, which if distributed more rationally might in the long run save more lives, though in a less dramatic way. It is as if popular feeling needs from time to time some visible symbolic reminder that no price is too high in matters of life and death, while at the same time it is recognised implicitly that most people's day-to-day actions belie this valuation.
Perhaps medicine, too, needs its dramatic and expensive symbols of 'total care'. Apart from their research value, occasional examples of 'heroic medicine' underline the imperative to spare no effort in saving life. No doubt each doctor will continue to think of his own patients as suitable recipients of such care. But administrators, with a more distant view, ought to be able to distinguish between what it is possible to maintain as a norm, and what belongs to the category of the exceptional. The resulting compromise may seem unfair. It is an unfairness which is commonly accepted in other areas of life, however, and there is no inherent reason why the public should not come to accept that the most advanced and expensive forms of medicine cannot be available to all. The fact that they are available to some expresses an intention and a hope, and may pave the way for others to share in them. But the norm has to be set at a lower level.
In planning terms, the explicit recognition that some forms oftreatment have this symbolic character, might help to counter the pressure from each specialty to pursue its own interests to the limit. On some such principle as this it might then be possible to ensure better provision of basic medical care for all, while not neglecting the need for experimentation and the possibilities of advance.
